We study a continuous-time principal-agent model in which a risk-neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively infrequent losses. Firm size can be decreased at no cost, and increased subject to adjustment costs. In the optimal contract, investment takes place only if a long enough period of time elapses with no losses occurring. Then, if good performance continues, the agent is payed. As soon as a loss occurs, payments to the agent are suspended, and so is investment if further losses occur. Accumulated bad performance leads to downsizing. We derive explicit formulae for the dynamics of firm size and its asymptotic growth rate, and we provide conditions under which firm size eventually goes to zero, or grows without bounds.
Introduction
Industrial and financial firms are subject to large risks: the former are prone to accidents and the latter are exposed to sharp drops in the value of their assets. Preventing these risks requires managerial effort. Systematic analyses of industrial accidents point to the role of human deficiencies and inadequate levels of care. Similarly, the large losses incurred by banks and insurance companies during the recent financial crisis were in part due to insufficient risk control. These large risks present a major challenge to firms, investors and citizens. This paper studies the design of incentives to mitigate them.
One way to stimulate the prevention of large risks would be to make managers and firms bear the social costs that they generate. Yet, this is often impossible in practice, because total damages often exceed the wealth of managers and even the net worth of firms, while the former are protected by limited liability and the latter by bankruptcy laws. 3 This curbs managers' incentives to reduce the risk of losses that exceed the value of their assets. 4 Nevertheless, if the risk prevention activities undertaken by managers were observable, it would be straightforward to design compensation schemes that would induce them to take socially optimal levels of risk. To a large extent, however, these activities are unobservable by external parties, which leads to a moral hazard problem.
Besides informational asymmetries, another important aspect of large risks lies in their timing. Large losses are relatively rare events that contrast with day-to-day firm operations and cash-flows. 5 It is therefore natural to study large risk prevention in a dynamic set-up, where the timing of losses differs from that of operations. To do so, we focus on the simplest 1 See for instance Leplat and Rasmussen (1984) , Gordon, Flin, Mearns and Fleming (1996) or Hollnagel (2002) . 3 For instance, Katzman (1988) report that "In Ohio v. Kovacs (U.S.S.C. 83-1020), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled that an industrial polluter can escape an order to clean up a toxic waste site under the umbrella of federal bankruptcy." Similarly, the social losses created by the recent financial crisis exceeded by far the assets one could withhold from financial executives. 4 Shavell (1984 4 Shavell ( , 1986 ) discusses how a party's inability of paying for the full magnitude of harm done dilutes its incentives to reduce risk. 5 From now on, we shall generically refer to any realization of a large risk as a loss.
possible model: operating cash-flows are constant per unit of time, while losses follow a
Poisson process whose intensity depends on the level of risk prevention.
In this context, we study the optimal contract between a principal and an agent that provides the latter with appropriate incentives to reduce the risk of losses under dynamic moral hazard. The agent, who can be thought of as an entrepreneur or a manager running a business, is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability. She can exert effort to reduce the instantaneous probability of losses.
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Effort is costly to the agent and unobservable by other parties. The project run by the agent can expand, through investment, or shrink, through downsizing. While downsizing is unconstrained, we assume that the pace of investment is limited by adjustment costs, in the spirit of Hayashi (1982) or Kydland and Prescott (1982) .
We also assume constant returns to scale, in that downsizing and investment affect by the same factor the operating profits of the project, the social costs of accidents, and the private benefits that the agent derives from shirking. This assumption implies that the principal's value function is homogeneous in size and enables one to characterize the optimal contract explicitly. However, as discussed in the paper, some of our key qualitative results are robust to relaxing the constant returns to scale assumption.
The optimal contract maximizes the expected value that the principal derives from an incentive feasible risk prevention policy. It relies on two instruments: positive payments to the agent, and project size management through downsizing and investment. While these decisions are functions of the entire past history of the loss process, this complex history dependence can be summarized by two state variables: the size of the project, and the continuation utility of the agent. The former reflects the history of past downsizing and investment decisions, while the latter reflects the prospect of future payments to the agent.
The evolution of the agent's continuation utility mirrors the dynamics of losses, and thus serves as a track record of the agent's performance. 7 We characterize the compensation and size management policy arising in the optimal contract.
First consider the compensation policy. To motivate the agent, the optimal contract relies on the promise of payments after good performance and the threat of reductions in her continuation utility after losses. When the track record of the agent is relatively poor, there is a probation phase during which she does not receive any payment. As long as no loss occurs, the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent increases until it reaches a 6 Unlike in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) or Akerlof and Katz (1989) , effort merely makes losses less likely, but does not eliminate them altogether. As a result of this, losses do occur on the equilibrium path, and it is no longer optimal to systematically fire the agent following a loss. 7 That the optimal contract exhibits memory is a standard feature of dynamic moral hazard models, see for instance Rogerson (1985) . threshold at which she receives a constant wage per unit of time and size of the project, such that her size-adjusted continuation utility remains constant. As soon as a loss occurs, the continuation utility of the agent undergoes a sharp reduction and the contract reverts to the probation phase. The magnitude of that reduction in the agent's continuation utility is pinned down by the incentive compatibility constraint. The more severe the moral hazard problem, and the larger the project, the greater the punishment. The induced sensitivity of the agent's continuation utility to the random occurrence of losses is socially costly because the principal's value function is concave in that state variable. Therefore, it is optimal to set the reduction in the agent's continuation utility following a loss to the minimum level consistent with incentive compatibility.
Next consider the dynamics of the size of the project. In the first-best, there is no need for downsizing. Since the project has positive net present value, investment then always takes place at the highest feasible rate in order to maximize the size of the project. In the second-best, however, the size of the project is lower than in the first-best. The intuition is the following. As mentioned above, the agent is partly motivated by the threat of reductions in her continuation utility in case of bad performance. Yet, when the continuation utility of the agent is low, the threat to reduce it further has limited bite, because of limited liability.
To cope with this limitation, it can be necessary to lower the agent's temptation to shirk by reducing the scale of operations after losses. Apart from such circumstances, and in particular when no loss occurs, the project is never downsized. In addition to downsizing, moral hazard also affects the size of the project through its impact on investment. Since increases in the size of the project raise the temptation to shirk, investment can take place only when the agent has enough at stake in the project, that is, when her track record has been good enough for her continuation utility to reach a given threshold. While payments when they occur are costly for the principal, investment benefits both parties. As long as investment takes place, the total size of the pie grows, which in turn makes delaying the compensation of the agent less costly. Thus it is efficient to invest before actually compensating the agent.
Note that the sequencing of compensation and investment is reversed in the first-best. This is because the agent, who is assumed to be more impatient than the principal, receives then all her compensation at time zero, before any investment actually takes place.
We obtain an explicit formula mapping the path of the agent's size-adjusted continuation utility into the size of the project. If one interprets the latter as firm size, this formula exactly spells out how firm size grows, stays constant or declines over time. Relying on asymptotic theory for Markov ergodic processes, we then characterize the long-run growth rate of the firm. In the first-best, firm size goes to infinity at a constant rate. Our formula for the long-run growth rate of the firm shows how, in the second-best, this trend in firm size is reduced by downsizing and possibly lower investment rates. When the adjustment costs are high, firm size eventually goes to zero. By contrast, when both the adjustments costs and the frequency of losses are low, firm size eventually goes to infinity, although more slowly than in the first-best.
Our paper belongs to the rich and growing literature on dynamic moral hazard that uses recursive techniques to characterize optimal dynamic contracts.
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Our main contributions are the following. First, we study the case where moral hazard is about large but relatively infrequent risks. As illustrated by recent industrial accidents or by the recent financial crisis, preventing such risks is a major challenge. We show that optimal contracts that mitigate the risk of infrequent but large losses differ markedly from those prevailing when fluctuations in the output process are frequent but infinitesimal. In the latter, as illustrated analyze investment in a dynamic moral hazard model with quadratic adjustment costs and a constant returns to scale production technology. As in our model, the agent's current continuation utility together with the current capital stock are sufficient statistics for the optimal contract. Our model differs from theirs in that we consider Poisson risk, while they focus on the case of Brownian risk. Moreover, while we are particularly interested in the asymptotic properties of firm size growth, the main emphasis of their paper is on the dynamics of Tobin's q.
In the context of a political economy model, Myerson (2008) contemporaneously offers an 8 See for instance Green (1987) , Spear and Srivastava (1987) , Thomas and Worrall (1990) or Phelan and Townsend (1991) for seminal contributions along these lines. By focusing on the case where the agent is risk-neutral, with limited liability, our model is in line with the recent papers by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) and Fishman (2007a, 2007b) .
analysis of dynamic moral hazard in a Poisson framework. A distinctive feature of our paper is that we analyze the impact of investment on the principal-agent relationship. Moreover, Myerson (2008) considers the case where the principal and the agent have identical discount rates. This case, however, is not conducive to continuous-time analysis, as an optimal contract does not exist. To cope with this difficulty, Myerson (2008) imposes an exogenous upper bound on the continuation utility of the agent. By contrast, we do not impose such a constraint on the set of feasible contracts. Instead, we consider the case where the principal is less impatient than the agent. While this makes the formal analysis more complex, this also restores the existence of an unconstrained optimal contract. This leads to qualitatively very different results. While downsizing is a key feature of our optimal contract, as it ensures that incentives can still be provided following a long sequence of accidents, it plays no role in Sannikov (2005) . Liquidation in his model is still required to provide incentives, but it corresponds to a predictable event: if a sufficiently long period of time elapses during which the agent reports no cash-flow, the firm is liquidated. By contrast, downsizing in our model is unpredictable.
Our paper is also related to the literature on accident law. Shavell (1986 Shavell ( , 2000 argues that the desirability of liability insurance depends on the ability of insurers to monitor the firm's prevention effort, and to link insurance premia to the observed level of care. If insurers cannot observe the firm's level of care, making full liability insurance mandatory results in no care at all being taken.
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In our dynamic analysis, the optimal contract ties the firm's allowed activity level to its performance record: following a series of losses, the firm can be forbidden to engage at full scale in its risky activity. These instruments provide the manager of the firm with dynamic incentives to exert the appropriate risk prevention effort, although the latter is not observed by the principal.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we formulate the incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints. In Section 4, we 9 Poisson processes have also proved useful in the theory of repeated games with imperfect monitoring, see for instance Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991), Kalesnik (2005) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) . Our focus differs from theirs in that we consider a full commitment contracting environment, in which we explicitly characterize the optimal incentive compatible contract. 10 Thus jumps in our model are bad news in the sense of Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991).
11 See Jost (1996) and Polborn (1998) for important extensions and qualifications of this argument.
characterize the optimal contract under maximal risk prevention. Based on this analysis, Section 5 studies the dynamics of firm size. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results.
In Section 7, we derive some empirical implications of our theoretical analysis. Section 8 concludes. Sketches of proofs are provided in the appendix. Complete proofs are available in the supplement to this paper (Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (2009)).
The Model
There are two players, a principal and an agent. The agent can run a potentially profitable project for which she has unique necessary skills.
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However, this project entails costs, and the agent has limited liability and no initial cash. By contrast, the principal has unlimited liability and is able to cover the costs. One can think of the agent as an entrepreneur or a manager running a business, and of the principal as a financier, an insurance company, or society at large.
Time is continuous and the project can be operated over an infinite horizon. The two players are risk-neutral. The principal discounts the future at rate r > 0 and the agent at rate ρ > r, which makes her more impatient than the principal. This introduces a wedge between the valuation of future transfers by the principal and the agent, and rules out indefinitely postponing payments to the agent. Without loss of generality, we normalize to 0 the set-up cost of the project.
At any time t, the size X t of the project can be scaled up or down. There are no constraints on downsizing: any fraction of the assets between 0 and 1 can be instantaneously liquidated. For simplicity, we normalize the maximal possible initial size of the project to 1, and assume that the liquidation value of the assets is 0. The project can also be expanded, at unit cost c ≥ 0. The rate at which such investments can take place is constrained, however.
This reflects for instance that new plants cannot be built instantaneously, or that the inflow of new skilled workers is constrained by search and training. Consistent with this, we shall assume that the instantaneous growth rate g t of the project is at most equal to γ ∈ (0, r).
This is in line with the macroeconomic literature emphasizing the delays and costs associated with investment, such as time-to-build constraints (Kydland and Prescott (1982) ) or convex adjustment costs (Hayashi (1982) ). Our formulation corresponds to a simple version of the adjustment cost model in which there are no adjustment costs up to an instantaneous size adjustment X t γdt, and infinite adjustment costs beyond this point.
Operating profits per unit of time are equal to X t µ, where µ > 0 is a constant representing day-to-day size-adjusted operating profits. While such profits are constant, the project is subject to the risk of large losses. In the case of a manufacturing firm, such losses can be generated by a severe accident. In the case of a financial firm, they can result from a sudden and sharp decrease in the value of the assets that the firm invested in. The occurrence of these losses is modeled as a point process N = {N t } t≥0 , where for each t ≥ 0, N t is the number of losses up to and including time t. Denote by (T k ) k≥1 the successive random times at which these losses occur. A loss generates costs that are borne by the principal rather than by the agent. For example, an oil spill imposes huge damages on the environment and on the inhabitants of the affected region, but has limited direct impact on the manager of the oil company. Or, in the case of financial firms, the losses incurred by many banks in 2007
and 2008 exceeded what they could cope with, and governments and taxpayers had to bear the costs. To capture this in our model, we assume that the agent has limited liability and cannot be held responsible for these losses in excess of her current wealth, so that it is the principal who has to incurs the costs. As for operating profits, we assume that losses increase linearly with the size of the project. Thus, if there is a loss at time t, the corresponding cost is X t C, where C > 0 is the size-adjusted cost. Overall, the net output flow generated by the project during the infinitesimal time interval (t,
By exerting effort, the agent affects the probability with which losses occur: a higher effort reduces the probability Λ t dt that a loss occurs during (t, Remark It is natural to assume that operating profits and losses are increasing in the size of the project. It is also natural to assume that the opportunity cost of risk prevention is increasing in the size of the project: it takes more time, effort and energy to check compliance and monitor safety processes in two plants than in a single plant, or for a large trading room with many traders than for a small one. Note however that we demand more than monotonicity, since we assume that operating profits, losses and private benefits are linear in the size of the project. This constant returns to scale assumption is made for tractability. As shown in Section 4, it implies that the value function solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (23) is homogeneous of degree one, which considerably simplifies the characterization of the optimal contract. Yet, even without this assumption, some of the qualitative features of our analysis are upheld, as discussed in Section 6.
We assume throughout the paper that µ − λC r > c (1) and that
The left-hand side of (1) is the present value of the net expected cash-flow generated by one unit of capacity over an infinite horizon when the agent always exerts effort. The right-hand side of (1) is the cost of an additional unit of capacity. Condition (1) implies that the project has positive net present value and that investment is desirable when the agent always exerts effort. The left-hand side of (2) is the size-adjusted expected social cost of increased risk when the agent shirks. The right-hand side of (2) is the size-adjusted private benefit from shirking. Condition (2) implies that in the absence of moral hazard, it is socially optimal to require the agent to always exert effort. The first-best policy can therefore be characterized as follows: first, the project is initiated at its maximal capacity of 1, and then grows at the maximal feasible rate γ with no downsizing ever taking place; second, a maximal risk prevention policy is implemented in which the agent always exerts effort.
From now on, we focus on the case where there is asymmetric information. Specifically, we assume that, unlike profits and losses, the agent's effort decisions are not observable by the principal. This leads to a moral hazard problem, whose key parameters are B and ∆λ.
The larger the size-adjusted private benefit B is, the more attractive it is for the agent to shirk. The lower ∆λ is, the more difficult it is to detect shirking. The contract between the principal and the agent is designed and agreed upon at time 0. The agent reacts to this contract by choosing an effort process Λ = {Λ t } t≥0 . We assume that the players can fully commit to a long-term contract.
Remark Throughout the paper, we thus abstract from imperfect commitment problems and focus on a single source of market imperfection: moral hazard in risk prevention. This assumption is standard in the dynamic moral hazard literature, see for instance Rogerson A contract specifies downsizing, investment and liquidation decisions, as well as payments to the agent, as functions of the history of past losses. The size process X = {X t } t≥0 is positive, with initial condition X 0 ≤ 1. The size of the project can be decomposed as:
for all t ≥ 0, where
, the cumulative downsizing process, is decreasing, and X i = {X i t } t≥0 , the cumulative investment process, is increasing. Our assumptions imply that X i is absolutely continuous with respect to time, that is:
where the instantaneous growth rate of the project satisfies
for all t ≥ 0. The positive and increasing process describing the cumulative transfers to the agent is denoted by L = {L t } t≥0 . The time at which liquidation occurs, if ever, is denoted by τ . We allow τ to be infinite and we let X t = 0 and L t = L τ for all t > τ .
At any time t prior to liquidation, the sequence of events during the infinitesimal time interval [t, t + dt] can heuristically be described as follows:
1. The size X t of the project is determined, that is, there is downsizing, or investment, or the size remains constant.
2. The agent takes her effort decision Λ t .
3. With probability Λ t dt, there is a loss, in which case dN t = 1.
4. The agent receives a positive transfer dL t .
The project is either liquidated or continued.
According to this timing, the downsizing and effort decisions are taken before knowing the current realization of the loss process. Formally, the processes X and Λ are Given a contract Γ = (X, L, τ ) and an effort process Λ, the expected discounted utility of the agent is
while the expected discounted profit of the principal is
An effort process Λ is incentive compatible with respect to a contract Γ if it maximizes the agent's expected utility (6) given Γ. The problem of the principal is to find a contract Γ and an incentive compatible effort process Λ that maximize its expected discounted profit (7), subject to delivering to the agent a required expected discounted utility level. It is without loss of generality to focus on contracts Γ such that the present value of the payments to the agent is finite, that is:
Indeed, by inspection of (7), if the present value of the payments to the agent were infinite, the fact that ρ > r would imply infinitely negative expected discounted profits for the principal. The latter would be better off proposing no contract altogether.
Incentive Compatibility and Limited Liability
To characterize incentive compatibility, we rely on martingale techniques similar to those introduced by Sannikov (2008 considers how it will affect her continuation utility, defined as:
Denote by W (Γ, Λ) = {W t (Γ, Λ)} t≥0 the agent's continuation utility process. Note that,
In particular, W t (Γ, Λ) reflects whether or not there was a loss at time t. To characterize how the agent's continuation utility evolves over time, it is useful to consider her lifetime expected utility, evaluated conditionally upon the information available at time t, that is:
Since U t (Γ, Λ) is the expectation of a given random variable conditional on F N t , the process
which is integrable by (8).
Relying on this martingale property, we now offer an alternative representation of U (Γ, Λ).
Consider the process
for all t ≥ 0. Equation (11) is best understood when Λ is a constant process. In that case, 
Along with (11) , (12) implies that the lifetime expected utility of the agent evolves in response to the jumps of the process N . At any time t, the change in U t (Γ, Λ) is equal to the product between a F N -predictable function of the past, namely e −ρt H t (Γ, Λ), and a term −dM Λ t reflecting the events occurring at time t. This term is in turn equal to the difference between the instantaneous probability Λ t dt of a loss, and the instantaneous change dN t in the total number of losses, which is equal to 0 or 1. Equations (10) and (12) imply that the continuation utility of the agent evolves as:
for all t ∈ [0, τ ). Equation (13) states that, net of private benefits and wages, the expected instantaneous change in the continuation utility of the agent is equal to her discount rate ρ, while H(Γ, Λ) is the sensitivity to losses of this utility. Building on this analysis, and
, we obtain the following result, in line with Sannikov (2008, Proposition 2).
Proposition 1 A necessary and sufficient condition for the effort process Λ to be incentive compatible given the contract
It follows from (13) that, if there is a loss at some time t ∈ [0, τ ), the agent's continuation utility must be instantaneously reduced by an amount H t (Γ, Λ).
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Proposition 1 states that, in order to induce the agent to choose a high level of risk prevention, this reduction in her continuation utility must be at least as large as X t b. This is because X t b reflects the attractiveness of the private benefits obtained by the agent when shirking. To reason in size-adjusted terms, let h t =
H t Xt
. The incentive compatibility condition (14) under which Λ t = λ then rewrites as:
It is convenient to introduce the notation W t − (Γ, Λ) = lim s↑t W s (Γ, Λ) to denote the lefthand limit of the process W (Γ, Λ) at t > 0. While W t (Γ, Λ) is the continuation utility of the agent at time t after observing whether or not there was a loss at time t, W t − (Γ, Λ) is the continuation utility of the agent evaluated before such knowledge is obtained.
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Observe that, while the process
Combining the fact that the continuation utility of the agent must remain positive according to the limited liability constraint, with the fact that it must be reduced by an amount H t (Γ, Λ) if there is a loss at time t according to (13) , one must have
for all t ∈ [0, τ ). To simplify notation, we shall drop the arguments Γ and Λ in the remainder of the paper.
Optimal Contracting with Maximal Risk Prevention
While in the previous section we considered general effort processes, in the present section we characterize the optimal contract that induces maximal risk prevention, that is Λ t = λ for all t ∈ [0, τ ). This is in line with most of the literature on the principal-agent model,
which offers more precise insights into how to implement given courses of actions at minimal cost than into which course of actions is, all things considered, optimal for the principal. In Section 6.1, however, we shall provide sufficient conditions under which it is optimal for the principal to request maximal risk prevention from the agent. The optimal contract that we derive in this section can be described with the help of two state variables: the size of the project, resulting from past downsizing and investment decisions, and the continuation utility of the agent, reflecting future payment decisions. To build intuition, we first provide a heuristic derivation of the principal's value function and of the main features of the optimal contract. Next, we verify that this candidate value function is indeed optimal, and we fully characterize the optimal contract.
A Heuristic Derivation
In this heuristic derivation, we suppose that transfers are absolutely continuous with respect to time, and that no payment is made after a loss, that is:
where
is defined by (6) . for all t ≥ 0. Here { t } t≥0 , is assumed to be an F N -predictable process representing the size-adjusted transfer flow to the agent. We will later verify that this conjecture is correct at the optimal contract. Now consider project size. Downsizing is suboptimal in the first-best, and, as we will later verify, it remains so in the second-best as long as no losses occur. After losses, however, downsizing may prove necessary in the second-best. This reflects that, for incentive purposes, it is necessary to reduce the agent's continuation utility after each loss by an amount that is proportional to her private benefits from shirking. The latter, in turn, are proportional to the size of the project. When the continuation utility of the agent is low, the incentive compatibility constraint is compatible with the limited liability constraint only if the size of the project is itself low enough.
To see this more precisely, suppose that, at the outset of time t, the size of the project is X t and the continuation utility of the agent is W t − . If there is a loss at time t, the agent's continuation utility must be reduced from
At this point, the question arises whether this loss implies that the project should be downsized. Denote by
the size of the project just after time t. Since effort is still required from the agent, Proposition 1 implies that, if there were a second loss, arbitrarily close to the first, the continuation utility of the agent would have to be reduced further by at least X t + b.
This would be consistent with limited liability only if
Hence, downsizing is necessary after the first loss, that is x t < 1, whenever the initial size-adjusted continuation utility w t of the agent is so low that
We are now ready to characterize the evolution of the continuation value F (X t , W t − ) of the principal. Since the principal discounts the future at rate r, his expected flow of value at time t is given by
This must be equal to the sum of the expected instantaneous cash-flows and of the expected rate of change in his continuation value. The former are equal to the expected net cash-flow from the project, minus the cost of investment and the expected payment to the agent. By (4) and (17) , this yields
To evaluate the expected rate of change in the principal's continuation value, we use the dynamics (3) of the project's size along with that of the agent's continuation utility, setting Λ t = λ in (13) . Applying the change of variable formula for processes of bounded variation, which is the counterpart of Itô's formula for these processes, this yields
The first term arises because of the drift of W · − , the second corresponds to investment, and the third reflects the possibility of jumps in the project's size and in the agent's continuation utility due to losses. Adding (22) to (21), identifying to (20) , and letting dt go to 0, we obtain that the value function of the principal satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
where the maximization in (23) is over the set of controls (g t , h t , t , x t ) that satisfy constraints (5), (15) , (18) and (19) .
To get more insight into the structure of the solution, we impose further restrictions on the function F , that we will later check to be satisfied at the optimal contract. First, because of constant returns to scale, it is natural to require F to be homogenous of degree 1,
Intuitively, f maps the size-adjusted continuation utility w t of the agent into the size-adjusted continuation value of the principal. Second, we require f to be globally concave. This property, which will be formally established in the verification theorem below, has the following economic interpretation. As argued above, while downsizing is inefficient in the first-best, it is necessary in the second-best to provide incentives to the agent when w t is low. When this is the case, the principal's value reacts strongly to bad performance because the latter significantly raises the risk of costly downsizing. By contrast, when w t is large, bad performance has a more limited impact on downsizing risk. This greater sensitivity to shocks when w t is low than when it is large is reflected in the concavity of the 21 See for instance Dellacherie and Meyer (1982, Chapter VI, Section 92).
size-adjusted value function f . Finally, we set
. This is just by convention, and to simplify the notation, since, by (14) and (16), w t never enters the interval [0, b).
We can now derive several properties of the optimal controls in the Hamilton-JacobiBellman equation. Optimizing with respect to t and using the homogeneity of F yields
with equality only if t > 0. Intuitively, the left-hand side of (24) is the increase in the principal's continuation value due to a marginal increase in the agent's continuation utility, while the right-hand side is the marginal cost to the principal of making an immediate payment to the agent. It is optimal to delay payments as long as they are more costly than utility promises, that is, as long as the inequality in (24) is strict. The concavity of f implies that this is the case when w t is below a given threshold, which we denote by w 
In the first-best, all payments to the agent would be made at time 0, as she is more impatient than the principal. By contrast, in the second-best, payments must be delayed and made contingent to a long enough record of good performance, in order to provide incentives to the agent. Since f is concave, it follows from (24) and (25) Suppose that w t is below the threshold w p , implying that t = 0. Then, using the homogeneity of F , one can rewrite (23) as follows:
Since f is concave and vanishes at 0, the mapping x t → x t f wt−ht x t is increasing. It is thus optimal to let x t be as high as possible in (26) , reflecting that downsizing is costly since the project is profitable. Using (19) along with the fact that x t ≤ 1 then leads to the second property of the optimal contract.
Property 2
The optimal downsizing policy if there is a loss at time t is given by
This property of the optimal contract reflects that downsizing is imposed only as the last resort, in order to maintain the consistency between the incentive compatibility constraint and the limited liability constraint. Using our convention that f is linear over [0, b] , one can substitute (27) into (26) to obtain
The concavity of f implies that it is optimal to let h t be as low as possible in (28), which according to the incentive compatibility condition (15) leads to the third property of the optimal contract.
Property 3 The sensitivity to losses of the agent's continuation utility is given by
Intuitively, (29) reflects that because the principal's continuation value is concave in the agent's continuation utility, it is optimal to reduce the agent's exposure to risk by letting h t equal the minimal value consistent with her exerting effort.
Finally turn to investment decisions. Note that the size-adjusted social value of the project, f (w) + w, is increasing in w until w p and flat afterwards. A necessary and sufficient condition for investment to ever take place is that the maximal size-adjusted social value of the project be larger than the unit cost of investment:
If (30) does not hold, the value of investment is lower than its cost, and hence it is suboptimal to invest. Thus, as will be checked below in the verification theorem, there is some investment in the optimal contract only if c is not too high. Optimizing in (28) with respect to g t under constraint (5), we obtain that g t = γ if
and g t = 0 otherwise. The left-hand side of (31) is the marginal benefit of an additional capacity unit, while the right-hand side is the unit cost of investment. Scale expansion is optimal when the former is greater than the latter. In that case, because of the linearity in the technology, size grows at the maximal feasible rate γ. The concavity of f implies that (31) holds when w t is above a given threshold, which we denote by w i . The optimal contract thus satisfies the following property. 
In the first-best, because of condition (1) 
where the delay differential operator L is defined by
In the investment region (w
where the delay differential operator L γ is defined by
Comparing equations (35) and (36) to equations (33) and (34) reveals that, besides the decrease γc in the size-adjusted cash-flow, the impact of investment at rate γ is comparable to that of a decrease γ in both the principal's and the agent's discount rates. Intuitively, this reflects that investment makes delaying payments less costly, because the total size of the pie grows while the players wait. Thus, although incentive considerations imply that both investment and payments should be delayed relative to the first-best, investment takes place before payments do, as stated now. (25) and (30) . While investment takes place in a region where the size-adjusted social value of the project is strictly increasing, payments are made to the agent when the size-adjusted social value of the project reaches its maximum, so that it is inefficient to delay payments any longer. At the payment threshold w p , transfers are constructed in such a way that the agent's continuation utility stays constant until there is a loss. That is, they are set to the highest level consistent with the size-adjusted social value remaining at its maximum.
This level can be computed as follows. Setting Λ t = λ in (13) and making use of (17) and Property 3, we obtain that
Suppose now that w t = w p , so that the size-adjusted social value of the project is at its maximum, and that dN t = 0, so that there is no loss at time t. Then W t = X t w p and dX t = X t γdt. Substituting in (37), we obtain the following property.
Property 6 The size-adjusted transfer flow if there is no loss at time t is
According to (38) , when payments are made at the payment threshold w p , they come in a steady flow in size-adjusted terms until a loss occurs.
The Verification Theorem
We now show that the above heuristic characterization does correspond to the optimal contract. To do this, we first show that there exists a size-adjusted value function f such that Properties 1 to 6 hold.
Proposition 2 Suppose that
Then there exists a constant c > 0 such that if
the delay differential equation
has a maximal solution f, where the thresholds w p and w i are endogenously determined by (25) and (32) , with w
, and the operators L and L γ are defined as in (34) and (36) .
The function f is globally concave and continuously differentiable except at b.
If condition (39) did not hold, the solution would be degenerate, with downsizing taking place after each loss. This would arise because the private benefits from shirking would be large relative to the expected cash-flow from the project, making the agency problem very severe. Condition (40) ensures that the investment cost is low enough so that there are circumstances in which it is optimal to increase the size of the project. If condition (40) did not hold, the optimal contract would be similar to that described above, except that there would be no investment region. The threshold value c corresponds to the maximum of the size-adjusted social value of the project arising in this no investment situation.
The next step of the analysis is to show that the function constructed in Proposition 2 yields the maximal value that can be obtained by the principal, and to explicitly construct the optimal contract. To do so, fix an initial project size X 0 and an initial expected utility W 0 − for the agent, and consider the processes {w t } t≥0 and {l t } t≥0 solutions to we simply take these processes as given. Yet, consistent with the heuristic derivation of Section 4.1, it will eventually turn out in equilibrium that, at any time t, w t is the initial size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent, while l t represents cumulative size-adjusted transfers up to and including time t. The following proposition is central to our results.
Proposition 3 Under conditions (39) and (40), the optimal contract Γ = (X, L, τ ) that induces maximal risk prevention and delivers the agent an initial expected discounted utility
W 0 − given initial firm size X 0
is as follows: (i) The project is downsized by a factor
∧ 1 at any time T k at which there is a loss.
Moreover, the size of the project grows at rate γ as long as w t > w i
, and at rate 0
otherwise. As a result of this, the size of the project is
at any time t ≥ 0. 
at any time t ≥ 0.
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(iii) Liquidation occurs with probability 0 on the equilibrium path:
P-almost surely.
The value for the principal of this contract is
, with f constructed as in Proposition 2.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the optimal contract entails at any time t a 22 By convention, ∅ = 1. 23 Observe from (42) and (43) The main features of the optimal contract are also in line with the heuristic derivation of Properties 1 to 6. First consider transfers, as given by (43) Next consider the size of the project, as given by (44) . The first term on the right-hand side of (44) is the initial size of the firm. The second term on the right-hand side of (44) reflects downsizing, which takes place only after losses occur at the random times T k and when
. This is consistent with Properties 2 and 3. The third term on the righthand side of (44) This is consistent with Property 3. By contrast, if a loss occurs at a time T k such that b ≤ w T k < 2b, the project is downsized by a factor
, and the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent drops by an amount w T k − b. Thus in any case, the sensitivity to losses of the agent's size adjusted utility is (
It should be emphasized that liquidation plays virtually no role in the optimal incentive contract, as reflected by (46) . Indeed, as can be seen from (42) Modeling liquidation in this way would allow to achieve essentially the same outcome as under downsizing. This would however be both less tractable analytically, and less conducive to a realistic implementation of the optimal contract.
Proposition 3 describes the optimal contract for a given initial project size X 0 and a given initial expected discounted utility W 0 − for the agent. In Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (2009, Section D.3), we examine how these are determined at time 0 whenever the principal is competitive. That is, we look for a pair (X 0 , W 0 − ) that maximizes utilitarian welfare under the constraint that the principal breaks even on average. As soon as f takes strictly positive values, it is optimal to start operating the project at full scale, X 0 = 1.
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When the participation constraint of the principal is slack, the contract is initiated at the payment threshold w 0 = w p , so that the agent is immediately compensated. By contrast, when the participation constraint of the principal binds, it is necessary to initiate the contract at a lower level w 0 < w p , so that it is optimal to wait before compensating the agent.
Firm Size Dynamics
In this section, we build on the above analysis to study size dynamics under maximal risk prevention. Because of downsizing and investment, the scale of operations varies over time in the optimal contract. These variations can be interpreted as the dynamics of firm size.
Our model generates a rich variety of possible paths for such dynamics. Over its life cycle, the firm can grow, stagnate or decline.
To illustrate this point, consider the following typical path, depicted in Figure 1 . Firm size starts at the level X 0 . As long as there is no loss, the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent rises, and eventually reaches the investment threshold w < 2b and there is another loss shortly afterwards, downsizing is necessary. 25 Otherwise it is optimal to let X 0 = W 0 − = 0 and not to operate the project.
While, in the short-run, firm size can grow, stagnate or decline, it is unclear how it is likely to behave in the long run. Will downsizing bring it down to 0? Or will the firm grow indefinitely thanks to investment? To address this issue, we study the limit as t goes to ∞ of the average growth rate of the firm until time t. For simplicity set X 0 to 1. Then Proposition 3 implies that this average growth rate is equal to
Now, let µ w be the unique invariant measure associated to the process {w T k } k≥1 of the agent's size-adjusted continuation utility just before losses, let µ w + be the unique invariant measure associated to the process {w T + k } k≥1 of the agent's size-adjusted continuation utility just after losses, and let λ be the exponential distribution random variable with parameter λ. Then, using an appropriate law of large numbers for Markov ergodic processes, one can derive the following result.
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Proposition 4 Under conditions (39) and (40), the long-run growth rate of the firm is
P-almost surely, where The first term of the right-hand size of (48) reflects the impact of downsizing. Downsizing takes place when losses occur, which is more likely if the intensity λ of the loss process N is high, and when the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent lies in the region [b, 2b) where downsizing cannot be avoided whenever a loss occurs.
The second term of the right-hand size of (48) side of (48) , as well as on the length T k+1 − T k of this time interval. This is why there is a double integral in (48) , with respect to the invariant measures µ w + and λ of these two independent random variables. The interpretation of the term in parentheses inside the double integral is that there is no investment during ( To gain more insights into the long-run behavior of the size of the firm, consider for tractability the case where c is small, so that
In that case, the optimal contract stipulates that investment should continuously take place at rate γ, and we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5
Under conditions (39) , (40) and (49) , if γ is close to 0, then
P-almost surely, while if γ >
First consider (50) . In that case, the maximal feasible growth rate γ of the firm is low, so that the impact of investment is negligible. Now, to maintain incentive compatibility and limited liability, downsizing must take place when losses occur and the agent's size-adjusted continuation utility is close to its lower bound b. Because the stochastic process describing the agent's size-adjusted continuation utility is Markov ergodic over [b, w p ], this situation will prevail an infinite number of times with probability 1. As a result of this, the size of the firm and the continuation utility of the agent must eventually go to 0.
Next consider (51) . In that case, the maximal feasible growth rate γ of the firm is high relative to the frequency λ of losses, so that the positive effect of investment dominates the negative effect of downsizing. Thus, in the long run, the firm becomes infinitely large. Note however that, even in this case, the long-run growth rate of the firm remains strictly lower than in the first-best, because of downsizing.
These two asymptotic results differ from the classic immiseration result of Thomas and Worrall (1990) . In their model, the agent's continuation utility eventually diverges to −∞.
But the reason why this outcome obtains differs from the reason why, in our model, firm size goes to 0 when γ is low. Indeed, in Thomas and Worrall (1990) , the period utility function of the agent is concave and unbounded below. Consequently, providing incentives is cheaper, the lower the agent's continuation utility is. This reflects the fact that the cost of obtaining a given spread in the agent's continuation utility is then lower. The principal thus has an incentive to let the agent's utility drift to −∞. By contrast, in our model, the cost of incentive compatibility is high when the agent's continuation utility is low. This reflects the fact that limited liability makes it then more difficult to induce large variations in the agent's continuation utility. Yet, firm size can go to 0 if γ is low relative to λ, so that the effect of downsizing overcomes that of investment. If γ is high relative to λ, firm size goes to infinity. Now, the continuation utility of the agent is equal to her size-adjusted continuation utility, which by construction lives in [b, w p ], multiplied by firm size. Hence in that case the continuation utility of the agent eventually goes to ∞, which is exactly the opposite of the immiseration result.
Proposition 5 provides parameter restrictions under which firm size X t unambiguously goes to 0 or ∞ with probability 1 when t goes to ∞. More generally, for all parameter values, including those under which (49) does not hold, the following holds.
Proposition 6
Under conditions (39) and (40), each of the events {lim t→∞ X t = 0} and {lim t→∞ X t = ∞} has either a probability 0 or 1 of occurring.
The intuition for this result is twofold. First, as can be seen from (44), the events that firm size goes to 0 or to ∞ are tail events. That is, whether or not they occur depends on what happens in the long run, and not on what happens over any finite horizon. Second, the stochastic processes that drive the evolution of firm size satisfy a mixing property, which implies that tail events have either probability 0 or 1. Note that Proposition 6 does not assert that one of the events {lim t→∞ X t = 0} and {lim t→∞ X t = ∞} must occur with probability 1: both of them may have probability 0. What it rules out, for instance, is a scenario in which, with probability p, the size of the firm eventually goes to 0, while with probability 1 − p it eventually goes to ∞, for some p ∈ (0, 1).
This asymptotic result sharply differs from that arising in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) . In their long-run analysis, either the firm is eventually liquidated, or the first-best is eventually attained and the firm is never liquidated. Each of these absorbing outcomes has a strictly positive probability in the stationary distribution. This difference with our results stems from the fact that, in their model, the principal and the agent have identical discount rates, while in ours the agent is more impatient than the principal.
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In Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), because the principal and the agent are equally patient, it is costless to delay the agent's consumption while capitalizing it at the common discount rate. Hence, it is optimal to try and accumulate pledges to the agent until her savings are so high that she can buy the firm and implement the first-best policy. With some probability, the agent is lucky enough that such high performance is achieved and the first-best is attained. With the complementary probability, the agent is not as lucky, and liquidation eventually occurs. By contrast, in our model, delaying consumption is costly, since the agent is more impatient than the principal. It is therefore optimal to let her consume before the first-best is attained. This reduces the growth in the accumulated pledge to the agent, which, in turn, raises the risk of downsizing. Whenever the maximal investment rate is low, such downsizing eventually brings firm size to 0 with probability 1. Whenever the maximal investment rate is high, firm size tends to grow so fast that it eventually goes to ∞ in spite of downsizing. Note however that, in that case, the first-best is not attained, even in the long run, because moral hazard still slows down the rate at which the firm grows.
Robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results. We first provide sufficient conditions for the optimality of maximal risk prevention. Then, we briefly examine the case of non constant returns to scale.
Optimality of Maximal Risk Prevention
So far, our analysis focused on the optimal contract under maximal risk prevention. We now investigate under which circumstances it is actually optimal for the principal to require such a high level of effort from the agent. For simplicity, we conduct this analysis in the case where there is no investment, that is γ = 0.
Note that the contract characterized in Proposition 3 depends on B and ∆λ only through
. Hence there is one degree of freedom in the parameters of the model, as one can scale B and ∆λ up or down while keeping b constant, leaving the optimal contract under maximal risk prevention unaffected. Intuition suggests that when ∆λ gets large, it is optimal to prevent losses as much as possible. To see why, observe that if a contract induced shirking during some infinitesimal time interval [t, t + dt), the agent's continuation utility would not need to be affected were a loss to occur at time t. That is, one should have H t = 0 in (13) . Since it is optimal to make no transfers over [t, t + dt) as the agent is shirking, (13) then implies that this would result in a change
in the agent's size-adjusted continuation utility. To determine whether requiring the agent to always exert effort is optimal, we compare the continuation value of the principal under maximal risk prevention to its counterpart when the agent shirks during [t, t + dt) and then reverts to exerting effort. The former is greater than the latter if
where dw t is given by (52) . The first term on the right-hand side of (53) reflects the increased intensity of losses over [t, t + dt) due to shirking, while the second term corresponds to the continuation value for the principal from requesting maximal risk prevention from time t+dt on. Given (52), a first-order Taylor expansion in (53) leads to
Unlike in (33) , there is no delay term on the right-hand side of (54), because the agent's continuation utility is not sensitive to losses during the time interval [t, t + dt). Maximal risk prevention is optimal if (54) holds for any value of w t > b. One has the following result. The intuition for this result is as follows. Both B and ∆λ affect the magnitude of the moral hazard problem and therefore the cost of incentives. However, under maximal risk prevention, they do so only via their ratio b; formally, this is reflected in the fact that the function f depends on B and ∆λ only through b. Now, while an increase in ∆λ makes shirking easier to detect, and raises the value to the principal of a high level of risk prevention effort, an increase in B leaves this value unaffected. Hence, when one keeps b and thus the cost of incentives constant, increasing ∆λ raises the benefit of effort for the principal without affecting its cost. As a result, when ∆λ is sufficiently high, it is optimal for the principal to require the agent to always exert effort.
Non Constant Returns to Scale
Our analysis relies on the assumption that there are constant returns to scale. What can be said when one relaxes this assumption? Suppose for instance that the private benefits from shirking are equal to some increasing function B(X) of firm size X, and, for simplicity, keep all our other assumptions unchanged. Incentive compatibility conditions are basically the same in that extension. The continuation utility of the agent writes as:
and the underlying martingale is still M Λ , so that the martingale representation theorem applies and Lemma 1 continues to hold. Similarly, Proposition 1 is essentially unchanged, except that the incentive compatibility condition under which the agent exerts effort is now
Suppose now that the principal wants to implement maximal risk prevention. Then, as when returns to scale are constant, it will be necessary to downsize the project after a loss if the agent's continuation utility is too low. To see this more precisely, suppose that, at the outset of time t, the size of the project is X t and the continuation utility of the agent is
If there is a loss at time t, incentive compatibility requires that the continuation utility be reduced by at least
. Downsizing can avoided at this point only if the new level of continuation utility is high enough that it is still possible to provide incentives while satisfying the limited liability constraint, that is, if
Thus downsizing must take place whenever
and there is a loss at time t.
Yet, it is hard to push the analysis of the optimal contract much further without assuming constant returns to scale. Indeed, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation now writes as:
and it is difficult to study this delay partial differential equation when B(X) is not a linear function of X.
Empirical Implications
While, in the first-best, firms in our model should always invest, in the second-best the optimal contract stipulates that firms can invest only after a long enough record of good performance, at least when the unit cost of investment is not too low.
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Such clauses are consistent with the empirical results of Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) , who find that venture capital funding for new investment is contingent on financial and non-financial milestones.
They also find that such conditioning is more frequent when the proxy for agency problems is more severe.
In our model, the optimal contract specifies that after good performance agents will be compensated, while after bad performance the firm will be partial liquidated. This is in line with the contractual clauses documented by Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) . The circumstances in which downsizing takes place in the optimal contract can be interpreted as financial distress. This is in line with the empirical findings of Denis and Shome (2005) , who report that financially distressed firms are often downsized.
The implications for downsizing of our model are also consistent with stylized facts for financial firms such as banks or insurance companies. Indeed, prudential regulation implies that the scale at which these firms are allowed to operate is proportionate to their capital.
After losses, capital drops. Hence, in such circumstances, financial firms should be downsized if their capital before the loss was close to the regulatory requirement. This is similar to our optimal contract, provided one interprets W as a proxy for capital, which is natural, since both increase after good performance and decrease after bad performance.
In our model, small firms tend to be below the investment threshold. They are thus likely to be exposed to financial constraints on investment, as documented by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the dynamic moral hazard problem arising when agents with limited liability must exert costly unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively infrequent losses. We characterize the optimal downsizing, investment and compensation policies and provide explicit formulae for firm size and its asymptotic growth rate.
Our analysis generates policy and managerial implications for the prevention of large risks. Under moral hazard, managers' compensation should be based on long-term track records, and it should be reduced after accidents or large losses by an amount that increases with the private benefits from shirking and the extent to which shirking is difficult to detect. Losses in our model are negative externalities, since they affect society beyond the managers' or the firms' ability to pay for the damages they cause. It is therefore natural to think of the optimal dynamic contract as a regulatory tool. For instance, in the context of financial institutions, our analysis suggests that, to prevent large losses, the compensation of bank and insurance managers should be regulated. Moreover, changes in expected compensation are not sufficient to induce an appropriate level of risk prevention: in addition, downsizing and investment decisions should be made contingent on performance.
Our analysis also generates implications for firm size dynamics. Simon and Bonini (1958) and Ijiri and Simon (1964) analyze the link between the stochastic process according to which firms grow and the size distribution of firms. While these early works do not rely on the characterization of optimal investment policies, they have been embedded within the neoclassical framework, see for instance Lucas (1978) or Luttmer (2007 Luttmer ( , 2008 . In these models, firm growth is limited by technology. In Lucas (1978) managerial skills are assumed to exhibit diminishing returns to scale, while in Luttmer (2008) it is assumed that, when ideas are replicated, their quality depreciates. Our modeling framework offers an opportunity to revisit these issues in a context where the endogenous limits to firm growth result from moral hazard. A key issue in models of the size distribution of firms is whether Gibrat's law holds, that is, whether firm growth is independent of firm size. This is not the case in our model, since firm size and downsizing and investment decisions are correlated in the optimal contract, being all functions of the agent's size-adjusted continuation utility process.
It would be interesting, in further research, to analyze the implications of our analysis for the size distribution of firms.
Appendix: Sketches of Proofs
In this appendix, we shall merely outline the structure of the proofs. The interested reader will find complete proofs in the supplement to this paper (Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and arguments to the case where output is modeled as a point process.
Proof of Proposition 2 (sketch). It turns out to be more convenient to work with the size-adjusted social value function, defined by v(w) = f (w) + w for all w ≥ 0. Just as f , the function v is linear over [0, b] . From (33) and (35), one has
for all w ∈ (b, w i ], and
for all w ∈ (w Proof for Proposition 3 (sketch). The argument follows somewhat standard lines in optimal control theory. In the first step of the proof, we establish that F provides an upper bound for the expected payoff that the principal can obtain from any incentive compatible contract inducing maximal risk prevention, that is:
for any contract Γ = (X, L, τ ) inducing maximal risk prevention. For any such contract, the dynamics of the agent's continuation utility W is given by (13) , for a process H that satisfies the incentive compatibility condition (14) . Substituting X and L from Γ into the function F , and applying the change of variable formula for processes of locally bounded variation Imposing limited liability and incentive compatibility, along with the homogeneity of F , the concavity of f and the fact that f + ≥ −1, we show that, in expectation, the right-hand side of (60) is greater than that of (59).
In the second step of the proof, we establish that the contract described in Proposition 3 yields the principal a value F (X 0 , W 0 − ). This contract must therefore be optimal, since, from the first step of the proof, F (X 0 , W 0 − ) is an upper bound for the value that the principal can derive from any contract that induces maximal risk prevention. Specifically, we start from (60) and we use the properties of the contract spelled out in Properties 1 to 6, and more precisely described in Proposition 3, to show that, in expectation, the right-hand side of (60) is in this case equal to that of (59).
Proof for Proposition 4 (sketch). In the first step of the proof, we establish that the process {w T k } k≥1 is Markov ergodic and then rely on the strong law of large numbers for 
P-almost surely. The main technical difficulty consists in proving that the integral on the right-hand side of (61) converges.
In the second step of the proof, we establish that lim t→∞ 1 t
P-almost surely. The argument goes as follows. Consider for each k ≥ 1 the integral Using the fact that N t − t converges P-almost surely to λ as t goes to ∞ by the strong law of large numbers for the Poisson process then yields (62).
In the last step of the proof, we establish that
which establishes (51) .
Proof for Proposition 6 (sketch). Consider for each k ≥ 1 the σ-fields Révész (1967, Example 2), we then show that a consequence of condition (66) is that for each ε > 0, there exists n 0 ≥ 1 such that the following mixing property holds:
for all k ≥ 1, n ≥ n 0 , and E ∈ F ∞ k+n , P-almost surely. Fix some E ∈ T , so that in particular E ∈ F ∞ k+n for all n ≥ n 0 . Since ε is arbitrary, the mixing property (67) then implies that P[E | F The result follows.
